
The effect of Compartmentalisation on ASB reduction in Secured by Design developments

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Please note all details from participants have been removed for anonymity purposes.

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Introduction

The design of the physical environment to suit the 'safety, security and well-being' of its citizens can be traced back to early prehistoric times, and has been sought throughout history (see Cozens, 2005: 153). The long tradition of changing and designing environments has been reflected in theoretical frameworks attempting to understand the extent to which the physical environment can affect the occurrence of crime (Wortley and Townsley, 2017). Frameworks such as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Defensible Space (Newman, 1973; Jeffrey, 1976) 'draw upon opportunity theories that assert that those involved in, or considering, criminality are influenced (to some extent) by their immediate environment', but that the alteration of certain features within their immediate environment 'can reduce that level of crime risk' (Armitage, 2013: 259). 'Immediate environment' includes the 'design of neighbourhoods' and housing estates (Crowe, 2000: 46) whereby several key principles such as 'surveillance, access control, territoriality, physical security, movement control, defensible space and management and maintenance' (Armitage, 2013: 261) have been devised to 'form the basis of planning policy and guidance, as well as CPTED based interventions such as Secured by Design (SBD) in England and Wales' (Armitage, 2013: 261).

Of particular interest to this study is the SBD initiative. It was developed by police forces in South East England, known as the Association of Chief Police Officers Crime Reduction Initiatives (ACPO CPI) and continues to be delivered on a 'day-to-day basis' by the Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs) or the Crime Prevention Design Advisors (CPDAs) (Pascoe and Topping, 1997; Armitage and Monchuk, 2010). Introduced in 1989, SBD was designed to reduce household burglary (Pascoe and Topping, 1997). The scheme encouraged the building industry 'to adopt crime prevention measures in development design to assist in reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime' (ACPO, 1999: 1). This aimed to 'create a safer and more secure environment' (ACPO,

1999: 1). The ‘broad-based initiative’ could be applied to a variety of housing developments such as ‘new-build housing, multi-storey dwellings, sheltered accommodation, commercial buildings and refurbishments’ (Cozens, Pascoe and Hilier, 2004:16). Housing developments then had to comply with the standards set out by SBD to be awarded SBD status (Armitage and Monchuk, 2010).

More recently, compartmentalisation was introduced in the SBD Homes report in 2016 to complement SBD regulations (Secured by Design, 2016). The concept of compartmentalisation was implemented on the basis that ‘larger developments incorporating multiple flats, bedrooms or bedsits can suffer adversely from anti-social behaviour (ASB) due to unrestricted access to all the floors and areas of the building’ (Secured by Design, 2016: 43). In response, the installation of dedicated doorsets and controlled lift access was recommended in buildings with no more than 25 flats whereby residents would only have access to their floor through the use of a fob or a swipe key card (Secured by Design, 2016). As compartmentalisation has been theorised to impact upon ASB, it is worth further discussing this type of crime.

The legal definition of ASB is widely recognised as being its official definition (Home Office, 2004).¹ Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ASB is ‘acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as (the defendant)’ (Home Office, 2004). Examples of such behaviour that are the most relevant to this dissertation include noise, rowdy behaviour, nuisance behaviour (i.e impeding access to communal areas), criminal damage/vandalism and intimidation (Home Office, 2004) which can be divided into ‘interpersonal ASB’, ‘environmental ASB’ and ‘ASB restricting access to public spaces’ (Millie, 2008: 12).

¹ It is worth noting however that there are definitional issues of ASB which will be further discussed in the latter parts of this dissertation.

Following the successes of SBD in reducing household burglary incidents, similar results have been projected for compartmentalisation on ASB in SBD housing estates. However, an evaluation of the relationship between the two has not yet been addressed (Secured by Design, 2016); this is the main reason why this area warrants study. This dissertation will therefore contribute to the missing literature on the effects of compartmentalisation on ASB and towards the understanding of a contemporary criminal issue in housing estates within the realm of environmental criminology more generally. To do so, this dissertation will examine the opinions of residents, estate managers and Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) officers on the ways in which compartmentalisation has affected ASB in the chosen estates, with a focus on community safety and community cohesion. Using data collected from telephone interviews, a thematic analysis will be conducted to determine whether compartmentalisation is part of the solution or truly *the* solution towards reducing and eventually preventing ASB in housing estates entirely. A discussion of the results and themes drawn from the thematic analysis will be presented, including an examination of the limitations encountered when conducting this research. Finally, this dissertation will conclude with a set of recommendations and a pathway for future research on the developing area of compartmentalisation.

Literature Review

1. Theoretical Frameworks: Origins of Crime Prevention through Design

1.1 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Developed by criminologist C. Ray Jeffrey in 1971, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) asserts that ‘the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life’ (Crowe, 2000: 46). Jeffrey believed that sociologists had placed too much emphasis on the social explanations of committing crime, and neglected the influence that environmental and biological factors could have on an individual becoming a criminal (Jeffrey, 1976; Cozens, 2005).

Stemming from other theoretical frameworks such as that of the routine activities theory (see Cohen and Felson, 1979) and the rational choice theory (see Cornish and Clarke, 1987), CPTED aims to identify and thus modify traits of the physical and social environment that may facilitate crime (Brantingham and Faust, 1976). Put simply, the framework aims to proactively (rather than reactively through criminal justice strategies) reduce the crime opportunities that can be provided by physical and social environments (Wallis, 1980, Cozens, 2005).

CPTED therefore emphasises three key strategies to reduce and prevent crime: ‘territorial reinforcement’, ‘natural surveillance’ and ‘natural access control’ (Jeffrey, 1976; Cozens, 2005: 162). Territorial reinforcement is concerned with providing users of an environmental space (such as an estate/residential development) a sense of ownership (Jeffrey, 1979). Examples of territorial reinforcement include ‘real’ barriers such as fences that delineate private spaces, public spaces and semi-private spaces from each other or ‘symbolic’ spaces such as signages (Jeffrey, 1979; Cozens, 2005: 163; Freilich and Newman, 2017). These ‘real’ and ‘symbolic’ barriers encourage legitimate

users of that space ‘to reduce opportunities for offending by discouraging illegitimate users’ (Cozens, 2005: 162). Natural surveillance focuses on promoting residents’ self-surveillance through the use of physical design features such as windows facing the streets, known as being part of capable guardianship (Painter and Tilley, 1999). Having windows facing the streets can give offenders a sentiment of being watched, even when this may not be the case, which may lead to prosecution and thus de-incentivise them from offending (Cozens, 2005). Natural access control uses ‘spatial definition’ to ensure that potential offenders do not have access to residential areas, particularly to main entrances of large blocks of flats or high/multiple storey buildings (Jeffrey, 1971; Cozens, 2005: 163).

One study that shows both the utility and the beginnings of CPTED is the work of American sociologist Elizabeth Wood in 1961 (Wood, 1961; Cozens 2005). Alongside the Chicago Housing Authority in the 1960s, Wood worked on developing security guidelines in public housing that could reduce teenage ASB (Wood, 1961; Colquhoun, 2004). She recommended placing vandal-proof materials around facilities, particularly that of children’s playing areas and encouraged enhanced visibility by placing benches in these playing areas and lobby entrances (Wood, 1961). As stated by Cozens, ‘her approach suggested that design and surveillability needed to be considered simultaneously’ (Cozens, 2005: 154). This was arguably one of the first studies to examine the relationship between ASB and crime prevention through design in housing areas (Cozens, 2005).

1.2 Defensible Space

Of particular importance to CPTED and later on to SBD is Oscar Newman’s theory of defensible space (Newman, 1973). As Jeffrey acknowledged, academic work on crime prevention strategies tend to be led by Newman’s theory (Jeffrey, 1999; Cozens, 2005).

Newman recognised both the lack of responses and the inadequate responses towards increased levels of crime in urban areas in the United States, specifically in inner city suburbs in the 1960s (Newman, 1973). The architect had noted a public housing estate (Puitt-Igoe) in St Louis with 2,740 units was demolished just under ten years after its construction (Newman, 1973). Its demolition was due to its increased litter, graffiti, vandalism and crime which had been caused by ‘an abundance of undesignated communal interior and exterior grounds’ and facilitated by a ‘river of trees’ (Newman, 1973; Cozens, 2005: 156). Residential occupancy was decreasing and those remaining in the estate were single-parent, welfare families (Newman, 1973; Cozens, 2005). In another older but smaller estate adjacent to that of Puitt-Igoe however, crime was relatively low, its occupancy was high with residents of similar backgrounds (to that of Puitt-Igoe) and was designed as several rows of houses (Cozens, 2005). Such observations became the foundations of Newman’s defensible space which highlighted the importance that design had, and has, towards reducing crime in residential developments (Newman, 1973; Cozens, 2005).

As defined by Newman, defensible space ‘is a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms; real and symbolic barriers, strongly-defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance; that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents’ (Newman, 1973: 3). Similarly to CPTED, use of defensible space allows for residents to feel a ‘sense of ownership’ of their estate/environment which enhances territoriality (Newman, 1973; Cozens, 2005: 159). Consequently, this reduces the likelihood that residents will allow for crime or vandalism to take place in their area (Cozens, 2005). As such, Newman argues that designing and building residential developments with the above characteristics along with internal corridors that cannot be seen from the streets is crucial towards preventing crime (Newman, 1973).

Newman also put forward the concept that inter-accessible lifts, staircases and exits in residential developments heighten the potential for crime to occur (Newman, 1973) which compartmentalisation within SBD tries to address and counter.

2. Evaluation of Secured by Design

Following from these theoretical frameworks is the SBD scheme which 'is heavily based upon key principles of CPTED' (Cozens, 2005: 162) and also has its roots in Newman's defensible space theory (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004; Teedon et al., 2009; Tilley and Sidebottom, 2017). Although the 'evaluations of the effectiveness of the SBD scheme' have been limited (Armitage in Tilley and Sidebottom, 2017: 248), the five evaluations which have been published have proven the success of SBD in reducing crime (Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; see Armitage, 2000; Teedon et al., 2009; Armitage and Monchuk, 2010).

All evaluations found that there was a reduction in crime when residential developments had achieved SBD status compared to their non-SBD counterparts (Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 2000; Teedon et al., 2009; Armitage and Monchuk, 2010). In a study conducted by Brown in 1999, the researcher compared official Home Office crime statistics from SBD and non-SBD properties in Gwent South Wales (Brown, 1999). Through the additional use of structured interviews with police officers, housing managers and architects, Brown's results revealed that SBD properties 'suffered a burglary and vehicle crime rate of at least a third of that suffered by non-SBD properties and two thirds the rate of criminal damage' (Brown, 1999: 58; Armitage and Monchuk, 2010: 4). Properties with SBD status also led to a 40% decrease in burglary and a 25% decrease in vehicle offences (Brown, 1999). The study therefore supported the effectiveness and the importance of surveillance and target hardening towards reducing crime rates (Brown, 1999).

Similarly, Teedon and colleagues studied the impact of SBD measures in Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) estate on housebreaking incidents and crime data by comparing these incidents to those in another estate without SBD doors and windows (Teedon et al., 2009). Prior to the installation of SBD doors and windows in some dwellings, there was 'no statistically significant difference' between the number of housebreaking incidents in SBD and non-SBD dwellings (Teedon et al., 2009: 4). Following the installation of SBD-approved windows and doors, housebreaking crime in SBD dwellings was lower compared to that of other dwellings (Teedon et al., 2009). Total housebreaking crime rates in SBD properties had decreased by 26% while attempted housebreaking decreased by 59% and theft by housebreaking had decreased by 18% (Teedon et al., 2009). Additionally, Teedon and colleagues found that dwellings becoming SBD installations had not resulted in housebreaking crime displacement which demonstrates another benefit of SBD measures (Teedon et al., 2009).

The evaluations on SBD measures in various sites also found that fear of crime in residents had decreased as result of SBD (Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 2000; Teedon et al., 2009; Armitage and Monchuk, 2010). Pascoe's study demonstrated this when he studied official Home Office recorded crime statistics and data from self-report questionnaires from residents of 10 different public-sector estates (including flats, semi-detached/detached houses, terraced houses, maisonettes) across England and Wales (Pascoe, 1999). As modifications to SBD standards had been made to the public-sector estates, residents perceived both reduced levels of crime and recorded crime in SBD properties compared to non-SBD properties (Pascoe, 1999).

Armitage's study yielded similar results when she too studied Home Office recorded crime statistics and residents' surveys in 25 SBD and 25 non-SBD estates in West Yorkshire (Armitage, 2000). Compared to their matched non-SBD estates, a lower number of residents in SBD estates felt they were victims of crime and felt unsafe at night alone and in streets (Armitage, 2000). The study

was re-evaluated by the researcher in 2009 which revealed the positive and continuous effects of SBD on reducing crime, and demonstrated that ‘the effectiveness of SBD developments built more recently had exceeded that shown in the original evaluation, with SBD developments outperforming their non-SBD counterparts in terms of crime reduction, visual signs of disorder and levels of fear among residents’ (Armitage and Monchuk, 2010: 13).

Cozens and colleagues however elucidate that ‘although there is confidence that SBD works, both critics and proponents are still unaware as to precisely *why* it works’ (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004: 20). They argue that the studies from Brown (1999), Pascoe (1999) and Armitage (2000) assessed above do not ‘focus exclusively on housing design or on how this variable might influence the performance of SBD properties compared with similar non-SBD properties’ (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004: 19-20). For example, in the study conducted by Armitage (2000), the author does not make reference to the actual design of the properties analysed even if the SBD and non-SBD estates are matched (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004). The findings of the study are valid (crime *was* reduced in SBD properties) however the specific reason as to *why* this occurred is unclear - this may be due to the design of the properties but may also be due to target-hardening (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004). Cozens and colleagues also made similar observations about Brown’s and Pascoe’s study respectively regarding the lack of design specificity of properties analysed and the impact of target-hardening (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004). For example, 3.5% of the SBD sample in Brown’s study were flats or shared accommodation compared to 10.1% in the non-SBD sample (Brown, 1999; Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004). Cozens and colleagues argue that since flats and shared accommodation have been found to be more vulnerable to crime compared to other types of accommodation (Kershaw et al., 2001), this may have impeded the results of Brown’s study (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004).

As emphasised by Cozens and colleagues, such observations are not to critique the studies conducted, but are rather an attempt towards understanding why SBD can reduce crime rates and if other factors contribute to this (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004).

3. Evaluation of Compartmentalisation

As compartmentalisation is a new concept, studies or evaluations conducted on this topic have been particularly limited. However, a study from 2008 to 2009 of SBD and compartmentalisation found a positive relationship between the decrease in burglary rates in Nottingham City Homes and the implementation of compartmentalised doors and secure windows (Secured by Design, 2016).

Inspired by the Designing out Crime programme for housing², the SBD Initiative was implemented in Nottingham City Home in 2008/2009 (Secured by Design, 2016). An evaluation was carried out examining the impact that installing secure windows and doors in Nottingham City Homes had on burglary rates, and specifically on the residential community (Secured by Design, 2016). Within the two housing estates where the SBD/compartmentalisation initiative had been piloted, burglary in Bells Lane and Broxtowe was reduced by 42% (Secured by Design, 2016). After the initiative had been completed, a decrease of 62 burglaries per year was observed compared to a decrease of only 33 burglaries per year in the non-Secured by Design housing estates (Secured by Design, 2016). Such results therefore demonstrate the utility of compartmentalised doors in residential areas and both its immediate and long term positive effects in reducing burglary.

² The Designing out Crime for housing programme was initiated to re-design the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme to promote positive imagery about community safety (Designing Out Crime, 2018).

4. Anti-social behaviour

4.1 Definitional issues of ASB

Although there is an official, legal, definition of ASB, literature surrounding ASB puts forward that it is a contested concept (Millie, 2009). As expressed by the Social Exclusion Unit: ‘there is no single definition of ASB (...) it covers a wide range of behaviour from litter to serious harassment’ which has led to ‘the inclusion of both criminal and non-criminal behaviour’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000: 14; Ramsay, 2004; Millie, 2008: 1682). The vagueness of its legal definition indicates that the issue of ASB has resulted in a paradoxical discourse, where ‘we do not know what it is, although it is sometimes said in response that we all know what it is when we see or experience it’ (Carr and Cowen, 2006: 59). This means certain types of ASB may be seen as criminal by some, but ‘tolerated or even celebrated as a valued contribution to contemporary life’ by others (Millie, 2009: 2). As stated by Millie:

‘While criminologists and legal philosophers have been debating the precise nature and limits of criminal activity for decades (e.g. Feinberg, 1984), determining what exactly makes certain behaviours anti-social may just be as difficult’ (Millie, 2009: 2).

These factors have thus rendered ASB both difficult to define and record (Nixon et al., 2003; Home Office, 2004; Ramsay, 2004, Millie et al., 2005; Millie, 2009). Such difficulties should not be overlooked however as ASB can have severe impacts on citizens’ well-being and on society more generally.

4.2 Impact of ASB

There has been a 6% decrease in police recorded ASB in 2017 in the UK (Bangs, 2018). Yet, it is an important crime to examine as ASB incidents can have a detrimental effect on the well-being

to those who experience it (Millie et al., 2005; Millie, 2009). ASB can impact the quality of life of individuals, families and/or communities by increasing fear of crime, annoyance and intimidation or threats, possibly leading to depression, anxiety and other mental health issues (Harrogate District Community Safety Partnership, 2011).

Due to its negative consequences, ASB has become a government priority in the UK which has affected legislation and policies regarding how to reduce the phenomenon since 1997 (Flint and Nixon, 2006). Of these are the Housing Act 1996, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, the Housing Act 2004 and more recently the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 which has gained royal assent in 2013 (Field, 2003; Flint and Nixon, 2006). Politically, ASB is seen ‘within a wider politics of behaviour’ (Rose, 1999; Field, 2003; Flint and Nixon, 2006: 37) which has been characterised as being ‘fundamentally caused by a lack of respect for other people’ (Home Office, 2003: 7). As a result, there has been a widespread responsibility on the part of ‘individuals as citizens, parents, neighbours and members of communities’ including government agencies (Home Office, 2003: 6) to lead a cultural shift towards ‘a proper sense of respect in British society’ (Blair 2005 in Flint and Nixon, 2006: 37).

5. Research question and hypotheses

As mentioned in the introduction, an evaluation on the effects of compartmentalisation towards reducing ASB has not yet been addressed (Secured by Design, 2016) but the existing literature on the matter infers there may be a link between the two.

The research question that will guide this evaluation is: ‘In what ways, and to what extent does the compartmentalisation of a SBD housing estate reduce ASB rates within that housing estate?’. The terms ‘in what ways’ also includes the impact that compartmentalisation has had on residents’ perception of ASB, and their perception on community cohesion within their estate.

Based on the findings in the academic works/studies provided above, the hypothesis is: ‘residents in the compartmentalised/SBD estate will witness lower levels of ASB than residents in the non-compartmentalised/non-SBD estate’. As there is no literature to suggest that compartmentalisation will lead to greater or lower levels of community cohesion, the null hypothesis will predict that: ‘residents in the compartmentalised/SBD estate will perceive equal levels of community cohesion within their estate than residents in the non-compartmentalised/non-SBD estate’.

The following chapters will provide further discussion on how the hypotheses were tested, and on the findings yielded when analysing the research question.

Methodology

1. Research Approach

This research required a methodological approach that allowed for an in-depth understanding of the topic studied.

Sherman and Webb argue that a qualitative research method ‘implies a direct concern with experience as it is lived or felt or undergone’ with ‘the aim of understanding experience as nearly as possible as its participants feel it or live it’ (Sherman and Webb, 1988: 7). Such definition encompasses the approach to this research most adequately: the aim of this dissertation is to understand the effects of compartmentalisation on ASB on those affected by ASB the most within the estates studied. Therefore, in order to understand both whether, and the extent to which compartmentalisation has an effect on ASB reduction in SBD estates, a qualitative approach was deemed most appropriate.

This research deliberately adopted a very similar data collection method with similar participants to that of the previous study on the effects of compartmentalisation on burglary rates in Nottingham City Homes (Jones et al., 2016). The collection method involved face-to-face interviews with residents, front line officers and staff from the estates studied (Jones et al., 2016). For this research, telephone interviews were conducted as this method resulted in less intimidation for residents, and thus generated more responses than when face-to-face interviews were initially proposed.

2. Telephone Interviews

2.1 Interview questions

The telephone interview questions were constructed by the researcher, and were tailored for three types of participants - residents, estate managers, and SNT officers - and were worded slightly


differently based on whether the participants resided in or covered the compartmentalised/SBD estate or not (see Appendix A, B and C). Each set of interview questions was structured in that they were constructed by the researcher prior to the telephone interviews taking place, however consisted of primarily open-ended questions. In order to determine their clarity and coherence, the interview questions were also piloted prior to the interviews taking place. No changes were made to the interview questions after they were piloted.

3. Estates


With the assistance of police constables and sergeants, the estates chosen for this research were that of Belvedere Park and Erith Park. Both estates were chosen as they are both located in the London Borough of Bexley, and have structural similarities - they are of similar age, size and property type - which aimed to heighten the fairness and internal validity of the study. The estates also had relatively similar socio-demographics, with properties being either privately owned, having shared ownership (in Erith Park) or rented temporarily.

Erith Park was entirely redeveloped from the 1960s and recently completed. The site is (almost) fully compartmentalised, and has achieved SBD accreditation to Gold Standard. Belvedere Park was constructed in 2014, and is not compartmentalised nor SBD.

Figure 1: Maps of Erith Park and Belvedere Park



Erith Park Estate - Lerner Road - DA8 3RD



Belvedere Park - Little Brights Road - DA17 6BF

Figure 2: Compartmentalisation - security fobs in Erith Park



**First security key fob
outside of flat buildings**



**Second security key fob
inside of flat buildings**

To answer the research question, the telephone interview responses provided by residents, SNT officers and estate managers from the non-compartmentalised/non-SBD estate were compared to responses from the participants in the compartmentalised/SBD estate.

4. Participants - please note this section was significantly shortened for data protection purposes

Overall, 13 participants were selected for interview, all of whom were over the age of 18. With assistance, participants from both Belvedere Park and Erith Park were contacted by the researcher from which interviews could be scheduled.

No participants withdrew from the telephone interview process.

5. Ethics

As per the ethical requirements given by the UCL Departmental Ethics Committee, participants were given a consent form to sign prior to the interviews taking place, which the researcher kept. In regards to the participant information sheet, this was provided to residents in

Erith Park and in Belvedere Park. Both the consent form and the participation information sheet iterated that the personal details of participants would remain confidential and anonymous, and that the data provided would be destroyed within three months from the data collection date. The participants were also told that they could withdraw their responses at any time and were provided with the researcher's contact details should they wish to do so and/or if they had any further questions about the research.

Several procedures were also undertaken to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of the data provided by participants. The transcripts of telephone interviews were password protected, and all interview recordings were deleted after transcripts had been written. All e-mail exchanges between the participants and the researcher were also classified into different folders, on different e-mail accounts to ensure that they could not be found - and any e-mails with participants' telephone numbers (needed to conduct the interviews) were deleted.

6. Procedure

The interviews were conducted between the 24th of June and the 9th of August, at various times and usually from the researcher's domicile. The participants were contacted prior to the telephone interviews taking place whereby a date and time convenient to both parties were selected, sometimes several weeks in advance.

Before the interview process began, interviewees would be asked if they had any questions or queries, and asked if they required additional information about the dissertation research. They would then be provided with a definition of ASB and of compartmentalisation, regardless if the participant was a resident or an estate manager from the compartmentalised/SBD estate or not. Following this, they would be asked if the interview could be conducted. Once the interview was concluded, the researcher would thank the interviewees for their time and ask them if they had any

comments they wished to add or omit. This was done to ensure interviewees were both comfortable and confident with the answers they had provided throughout the process.

The interviews were recorded using a Sony ICD-B140 4GB Dictation Machine, and also on the researcher's phone as a precautionary measure. Once an interview had been recorded, the researcher immediately transcribed the interview questions and responses verbatim (known as a verbatim transcript) to heighten the accuracy of the interviews for future analysis.

7. Thematic analysis

To analyse the data collected from interviews, a thematic analysis was undertaken using the NVivo 12.0 qualitative data analysis computer software package. In short, a 'thematic analysis focuses on identifiable themes and patterns of living and/or behaviour' (Aronson, 1995: 1). The approach to completing this thematic analysis was inspired by Braun and Clarke's six-phase framework as follows: 'familiarisation of data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining themes and producing the report' (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 15-23).

Once the data had been reviewed, the transcribed interviews were coded using an inductive approach. An inductive analysis allows for 'the themes identified to be strongly linked to the data themselves' (Patton, 1990 in Braun and Clarke, 2006: 12). As the relationship between compartmentalisation and ASB has not yet been examined, an inductive analysis was deemed most appropriate in comparison to other approaches to the thematic analysis i.e the deductive approach.

As such, the themes were identified with pre-existing questions in mind which had been developed at the 'familiarisation of data' stage. The data was then initially coded for the main themes of 'ASB', 'Compartmentalisation' and 'Community Cohesion' before being coded into their respective sub-themes.

Results and Discussion

Before discussing the themes drawn from the data collected, it is important to reiterate that this is a *preliminary* and *exploratory* dissertation on the effects of compartmentalisation on ASB reduction.

1. Anti-social Behaviour

When comparing ASB incidents in Belvedere Park and in Erith Park, it was apparent that residents in the compartmentalised/SBD estate felt that there had not been any ASB since they had moved in, thus proving the hypothesis. This sentiment was not shared with residents from the non-compartmentalised/non-SBD estate however, which will be discussed further below.

1.1 Types of ASB

Participants in, or covering, Belvedere Park all reported similar types of ASB in that they would be classed as being low-level incidents (except one incident), but witnessed or experienced a variety of different incidents. Two participants mentioned nuisance behaviour ASB, coming under 'ASB restricting access to public spaces' (Millie, 2008: 2):

“Teenagers who come onto the estate, they’ve got nothing to do, nothing in the area, so they come onto the estate riding their bikes around and when people ask them to leave they’re not leaving, that sort of thing.”

- Resident - Belvedere Park

Another participant also mentioned nuisance behaviour and noise, which extended itself to criminal damage/vandalism and intimidation falling under 'interpersonal ASB' (Millie, 2008: 12):

“I mean we get people who will ring our door and will use a whole load just to get through just to try and break in or do something unsolicited...whatever it may be. We had one person

kicking in the front door and they smashed through the front glass door to get to someone they needed to get to.”

- Resident - Belvedere Park

Other participants alluded to solely ‘environmental ASB’ (Millie, 2008: 12) consisting of:

“People throwing litter about, they’re smoking out, throwing things from their balconies or hanging clothes from their balconies.”

- Manager - Belvedere Park

The descriptions of these ASB incidents reveal that although participants all live in the same estate, they all witnessed different types of ASB incidents. For example, the reports of ‘environmental ASB’ from the above participants had very little unanimity between them: ‘people throwing litter from their balconies’ was the only ASB incident that was the same which demonstrates that even though the participants identified ‘environmental ASB’ incidents, the incidents themselves were dissimilar. As the sample size above is relatively small, it is also possible that the range of ASB witnessed or experienced could have been even more diverse had additional participants taken part in the research. Such results were not surprising however as they prove Millie’s (2008; 2009) view on the ambiguity of the term ‘ASB’ due to the different levels of interpretation it may have (Nixon et al., 2003; Home Office, 2004; Ramsay, 2004, Millie et al., 2005; Millie, 2009). Millie’s theory was further supported by estate managers at Erith Park when a resident (who was not interviewed) witnessed an incident which they thought constituted ASB:

“Now, the person rang that in and they thought it was ASB when obviously they were just kids congregating around the area doing what kids do so when you say ASB it’s all about perception really as well.”

- Manager - Erith Park

This highlights the extent to which perceptions of ASB may vary whereby ‘context, location, community tolerance and quality of life expectations’ shape our understanding of the phenomenon (Millie, 2008: 382). As a result, the ambiguities in clearly defining and understanding ASB both theoretically and socially suggest they have an impact on the interaction between SNT officers and residents:

“Unfortunately my perception of ASB and other people’s perception of ASB is totally different. I mean some people might come forward and say this is happening and I’ll think well actually no that’s not exactly ASB.”

- *SNT Officer*

The lack of understanding between residents and SNT Officers regarding ASB may place a strain on the communication both parties have with one another, which would further enhance an issue that has been present thus far:

“We (SNT Officers) probably don’t speak to them (residents) as often as we should, but it’s a two-way thing where they don’t speak to us as often as they should.”

- *SNT Officer*

Although Miller argues for ‘tighter definitional limits’ of ASB, the observations above do not necessarily indicate that an ‘absolute, precise definition of ASB’ is possible due to its ambivalent nature (Millie, 2009: 17). Nonetheless, participants’ perceptions of ASB provide insight into the difficulties faced when determining which interventions or measures can reduce ASB the most.

1.2 Frequency of ASB incidents

The different levels of interpretation that ASB can have were also reflected in the reports of how frequently participants thought ASB occurred in their estate. Residents perceived higher

frequencies of ASB incidents than SNT Officers, with a resident and an estate manager mentioning the cyclical nature of ASB. Excluding the different perceptions of ASB, varying ASB frequency reports among residents and SNT officers could be explained as follows: as mentioned above, communication between SNT officers and residents may be limited which suggests that residents do not necessarily report every ASB incident they have witnessed in their estate.

Although perceived frequencies of ASB were generally relatively high, only one estate manager reported ASB incidents as a daily occurrence, whilst some residents believed ASB occurred several times a week (up to 15 times a week) and other residents several times a month. This suggests that the more an individual resides in or patrols the estate, the more likely they will witness ASB incidents.

The differing frequencies in ASB incidents among residents also appeared to have a correlation with the impact the crime had on them. For example, those not feeling intimidated by ASB reported fewer ASB incidents than those who were annoyed by it or who understood why such crime would be intimidating. This conveys that ASB incidents were perceived as occurring more frequently if they elicited an emotional response in the residents witnessing or experiencing them (Rader, 2017), even if no participant feared ASB.

1.3 ASB caused by residents versus non-residents

The types of ASB described by residents in their estate indicated that these incidents were caused by both residents and non-residents. Whilst some forms of ASB, such as environmental ASB, were undoubtedly carried out by a few residents within the estate, residents' responses imply that the distinction between ASB caused by residents or non-residents can be unclear:

“Sometimes it’s difficult to see whether those causing ASB are residents or visitors. Not a long time ago, the main entrance door was smashed and this is quite thick glass so we

don't know if it was a resident or a visitor. As long as we don't know the person we cannot really know if the person is a resident or a visitor.”

- Resident - Belvedere Park

Alongside the difficulties in defining ASB, it is therefore also difficult to assess exactly who causes ASB. The lack of clarity between ASB caused by residents and non-residents further challenges the development of suitable security measures to reduce ASB in housing estates. However, all residents from Belvedere Park stated that the existing security measures in their estate had helped to reduce or were in the process of reducing ASB. These measures include a fob access to the main entrance door, an answer system with a camera and closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) which have been implemented recently (circa June-July 2018). Such consensus demonstrates that residents can still feel that ASB is being reduced without compartmentalisation. Yet, as stated by one resident from Belvedere Park: additional measures such as compartmentalisation need to be implemented. The following theme will therefore address participants' views on the effects of compartmentalisation towards ASB reduction, and community cohesion.

2. Compartmentalisation

2.1 Compartmentalisation and ASB reduction

As mentioned above, residents from Erith Park did not witness any ASB in their estate. Nevertheless, most residents (from Erith Park) asserted that compartmentalisation would reduce ASB incidents by restricting the access to estate buildings to non-residents. Similarly, estate managers confirmed that compartmentalisation was effective in reducing ASB, particularly as both had witnessed ASB incidents within the estate. The efficiency of compartmentalisation was apparent when comparing ASB levels in compartmentalised blocks of flats with a non-compartmentalised block:

“We do have one block actually that doesn’t have compartmentalisation so you have two floors that are outright owned or shared ownership and the other part of the block is all general needs, and where they (general needs residents) don’t have it (compartmentalisation) we have a lot of ASB there because the people on the lower ground just wander around the block making mischief.”

- *Manager - Erith Park*

Interestingly, ASB was not an issue on the two floors where flats are owned or have shared ownership, which supports the concepts of CPTED and Newman’s defensible space theory. It is apparent in the case above that ownership of a flat or flats in Erith Park promotes territoriality which leads to several outcomes. As mentioned by an estate manager in Erith Park and an estate manager in Belvedere Park, residents who own their property or properties have a better understanding of the purpose of compartmentalisation than those who don’t due to their vested interest in their personal safety. In turn, territoriality encourages residents to take care of their property (Newman, 1973) which, perhaps subconsciously, de-incentivises residents to commit ASB, and also reduces their tolerance of the crime on their floor. Although ASB occurred on the ground floor of the block, compartmentalisation ensures that other residents located in different parts of the building are not affected by ASB as explained by a police constable:

By reducing permeability through developments, compartmentalisation protects residents not only from outsiders, but also from other residents. Should a problem family reside in a property, their ASB will be restricted to others on the same floor only.

Residents in the compartmentalised part of the building were therefore protected from being a victim of ASB which highlights one of the benefits of compartmentalisation. As such, the implementation of compartmentalisation, complemented with a sense of ownership, appears to be

particularly effective in reducing ASB in Erith Park. In theory, this analysis could also be applied to other residential/housing estates.

2.2 Limitations to compartmentalisation

However, one resident from Erith Park did not believe that compartmentalisation could reduce ASB which should also be noted. Although the scope of compartmentalisation delineates clear objectives that the security measure is designed to address (Secured by Design, 2016), most of the ASB reported by residents (from either estate) took place outside of the buildings themselves, in carparks, or in residents' flats and balconies. As stated by one of the residents:

“I don't think that security measure (compartmentalisation) will really stop ASB, because I think if people want to do ASB then they can just play loud music, so whether you have security like that doesn't really make a difference.”

- Resident - Erith Park

This remark demonstrates one of the limitations of compartmentalisation and insinuates that due to the diversity of ASB types, the security measure is only able to target and reduce specific ASB incidents, i.e ASB inside flat buildings on ground floors, in stairwells and in lifts. For example, compartmentalisation is unable to prevent environmental ASB incidents or nuisance behaviour by non-residents coming into the estate, such as the teenagers on bicycles congregating in Belvedere Park. In addition, the majority of residents interviewed in Belvedere Park were not worried that ASB incidents would rise if compartmentalisation was not implemented in their estate. This is not to say that compartmentalisation is inadequate in targeting ASB; half of the residents interviewed in Erith Park did not think it was necessary to implement additional security measures other than compartmentalisation to reduce ASB. However, some ASB incidents are beyond its scope and control:

“There’s some stuff that happens outside the building that's also outside of compartmentalisation. But I think that within the block, it’s great.”

- *Manager - Erith Park*

As a result, the benefits derived from compartmentalisation can be complemented with additional security measures to further reduce ASB, particularly in SBD estates. As suggested by one resident from Erith Park, these include a residential social platform whereby residents can report an ASB incident in their building anonymously which is monitored by an estate manager. This was also advocated by a resident in Belvedere Park, along with a 24/7 or night concierge, on site security such as estate managers and police officers patrolling the estate more regularly, and increased CCTV cameras. Another resident from Erith Park living on the ground floor proposed that a fence should be placed between her property window and the road to prevent nuisance ASB/noise. If a ‘real’ barrier was implemented, this too would enhance territoriality, reduce potential ASB incidents and increase personal safety (Newman, 1973). Although all these security measures may be difficult to implement simultaneously, residents’ suggestions convey that there are several ways to reduce ASB as compartmentalisation alone is too restrictive in doing so:

“Anything to do with ASB (...), you’re never going to stop it. If someone wants to do something, they will find a way to do it but on the plus side, compartmentalisation will help (...) but it won’t eradicate it.”

- *SNT Officer*

Moreover, only one resident out of all those interviewed believed that compartmentalisation would be the *most* effective security measure to reduce or prevent ASB in their respective estates. The novelty of compartmentalisation, as well as the different perceptions of ASB may explain why residents listed different security measures to tackle ASB in their estate. For example, the resident who stated that compartmentalisation would be most effective in reducing or preventing ASB

incidents owned several compartmentalised flats, where he had never experienced issues with crime. Thus being familiar with the security feature, perhaps this resident had an improved understanding of the benefits of compartmentalisation compared to other residents who had never heard of the measure prior to being interviewed.

Another potential limitation that was interpreted from the data collected was with the current SBD regulation that only a building consisting of 25 flats or more should be compartmentalised (Secured by Design, 2016). This is not an explicit limitation of compartmentalisation per se, however the regulation is an important aspect of its implementation in SBD estates. All interviewees appeared to agree with the regulation itself (except one participant from Belvedere Park) and believed that all housing estates should benefit from this. However, just over half of the residents interviewed and estate managers in Erith Park maintained that 25 flats was too high a number for the regulation to be applied flat buildings. Most residents and one of the estate managers believed that, irrespective of the number of flats in a building, all flats should be compartmentalised. Some residents proposed that a building with a few flats - between three to five - should be compartmentalised, regardless of whether the estate was SBD or not. As pointed out by an estate manager at Erith Park:

“I guess it depends on how tall the building is. If it’s a high rise building 25 flats is very many, but if it’s only three floors with only four or five flats each you can still have a bit of trouble (...) I don’t think they all need it, I mean if you have a block of six flats it’s a bit overkill but maybe 25 is a little too far down the other way.”

- Manager - Erith Park

From the argument explained above, it appears that the regulation acts as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ measure that can only be applied to SBD estates if buildings within them consist of 25 flats or more. Therefore, the participants’ responses insinuate that the regulation should be considered for

buildings which contain less than 25 flats, especially if the estate is located in an area which is more vulnerable to being affected by ASB.

2.3 Compartmentalisation and community safety

Interviews with residents from Erith Park suggest that compartmentalisation has considerably contributed to overall community safety. In this context, community safety refers to having a quality of life that allow residents to perform daily activities within the estate without having to fear or be affected by ASB or crime (Northampton Borough Council, 2018). All residents from Erith Park stated that they felt safe in their estate as a result of compartmentalisation, with some residents comparing it to their previous non-compartmentalised/non-SDB estate:

“I can speak for myself and kids, I think we feel safer. As I said where we were coming from we were not as secure as where we are now so we can compare and contrast and we like this place better.”

- Resident - Erith Park

Three quarters of residents in Belvedere Park and SNT Officers also agreed that if compartmentalisation was implemented in their estate, this would strengthen community safety, and heighten their feeling of personal security.

However, although compartmentalisation can provide residents with a highly secured residential environment, one of the concerns with ‘too much’ security is that it can hinder the interactions between members of the community. Compartmentalisation may therefore have a negative impact on the ability for some residents to build social relationships with other residents:

“I think it’s (compartmentalisation) had an impact quite a lot because I live on the second floor, and I have a neighbour upstairs, I don’t really know them, nor do I see them or really talk to them.”

The resident's sentiment was not shared with other members in Erith Park, nor with other residents from Belvedere Park but in order to understand the social impact of compartmentalisation, it is worth assessing whether compartmentalisation can affect community cohesion. This is further addressed below.

3. Community Cohesion

Although 'community cohesion' has several definitions (Beider, 2012), the term in the context of this research refers to the way in which members of the community within the estates interact with one another, and their overall unity as a community.

Whilst most residents in Erith Park mentioned that they had some form of interaction with their neighbours, the sense of community established in Belvedere Park appeared to be greater. Two residents in Belvedere Park, as well as SNT Officers discussed several initiatives that residents would organise on a monthly basis alongside Pinnacle Places, the residential property management service of the estate (Pinnacle Places, 2018):

“They do hold I think it's monthly association meetings and they're really well attended, surprisingly well attended, which means that community cohesion is actually quite good ”

- SNT Officer

Social events and regular monthly meet-ups to discuss service charges were mentioned, as well as a Facebook group which allowed residents to share information on any criminal incidents they had witnessed in their estate with other residents. This finding therefore disproves the null hypothesis that 'residents in the compartmentalised/SBD estate will perceive equal levels of community cohesion within their estate than residents in the non-compartmentalised/non-SBD estate'; residents in Belvedere Park perceived higher levels of community cohesion. The different

levels of community cohesion could be explained - although this is not evidential - by the need for members of Belvedere Park to become a close community for self-policing purposes:

“If there wasn’t security on each floor (compartmentalisation) then I think if there were problems, people would perhaps get together more in terms of self-policing. So I think non-compartmentalisation maybe brings people together more because it forces them to.”

- *Manager - Erith Park*

If this were to be the case, compartmentalisation could act as a form of protection against ASB incidents for those who don’t have strong ties to their community. Conversely, the data collected from residents living in both estates suggest that compartmentalisation does not have a negative effect on the interaction they have with their neighbours (except one resident as explained above). Rather, the interactions and relationships that are created between residents depend on themselves:

“I’ve met some people who are really nice and kind and I’ve met some other people who don’t want to talk which I understand (...) but I don’t think the security measure (compartmentalisation) has had an effect on that.”

- *Resident - Erith Park*

This could be due to the changing dynamics of what constitutes a ‘community’ in residential estates, whereby:

“People from this day and age don’t live in each other’s properties like they did many years ago, you know people like to come home from work, shut the door, and that be the end of it. I don’t think you can blame compartmentalisation for that, I think it’s just the way people live now.”

- *Manager - Erith Park*

In addition, since the implementation of compartmentalisation in Erith Park, the interaction between managers in the estate and residents has been minimal. Perhaps surprisingly, the minimal interaction has been a positive outcome of compartmentalisation as the security measure has helped to reduce ASB incidents, meaning residents have not filed complaints about ASB nor against any lack of security in their building. Such outcome was hoped for by SNT Officers whom both believed that residents would report fewer criminal incidents if Belvedere Park was compartmentalised, and would thus notice a shift in their conversations with residents.

From these findings, compartmentalisation appears to have very little to no affect on community cohesion, despite potential changes in interactions between members of the estates.

4. Research Limitations

The research conducted was not without its limitations, which will be reviewed in this section. The views presented in the results and discussion chapter above were deducted using interview data from a limited number of participants. There were several reasons for this including administrative difficulties and delays in contacting some residents, and a lack of interest in participating by residents on the estates. This meant the researcher had to use other means to collect as much data as possible in the time frame provided. Although this dissertation is a preliminary and exploratory research piece, the small sample size limits the possible interpretations of the results which affect the generalisability, or the external validity, of the study (Hackshaw, 2008). Furthermore, only two estates were examined. Although this was appropriate for the scope of this evaluation by providing a comparative study on the research area, a more in-depth analysis of the themes presented would have most likely necessitated additional estates to be considered.

Another limitation encountered was that the residents in Belvedere Park were not explicitly asked whether they believed compartmentalisation could reduce ASB incidents in their estate. This was a major drawback to the research as a comparison between the answer provided by residents

from the non-compartmentalised/non-SBD estate and the compartmentalised/SBD estate was not possible. Similarly, for all participants, the follow up question to an initial question regarding the fear of ASB assumed that the participants *did* fear ASB. However, this was not the case. The error in phrasing the question had not been noticed when piloting the interview questions, which in turn hindered the relevance of the information obtained on the matter.

As a result of these limitations, and due to the novelty of the effects of compartmentalisation on ASB incidents, further research on the topic area is both encouraged and required to evaluate the validity of the research findings.

Conclusion

This research was undertaken to determine whether compartmentalisation has had an effect towards reducing ASB incidents in SBD estates. From the findings discussed, compartmentalisation has been particularly effective in reducing ASB incidents in flat buildings in a SBD estate, which is a promising finding for its future implementation in other SBD estates, and even in non-SBD estates. The security measure also provides distinct benefits for its users, including increased community safety and personal safety, and very little to no adverse effect on community cohesion. However, compartmentalisation can only reduce ASB in SBD estates to a *certain* extent. Some ASB incidents such as environmental ASB which occur outside of flat buildings are beyond the scope of compartmentalisation, and therefore necessitate other security measures to target their prevention. Consequently, compartmentalisation is unable to reduce *all* forms of ASB, which is difficult to achieve in itself due to the nature of ASB. Nonetheless, compartmentalisation provides *a* solution towards reducing particular types of ASB incidents in housing estates, which, if complemented with other security measures, could prevent ASB almost in its entirety.

Recommendations

It is therefore recommended that simple but effective security measures should be implemented alongside compartmentalisation. These include CPTED or Defensible Space (which are also part of Situational Crime Prevention) measures such as 'real barriers', street lighting, cobblestone roads, secured electronic gates with fob access and benches in outside areas to enhance natural surveillance (Wood, 1960; Jeffrey, 1971; Newman, 1973). In regards to personal security, residential social media platforms allowing residents to report ASB incidents in their estate could be advantageous, as well as increased surveillance on behalf of police officers, concierges and estate managers. There are numerous measures suggested here however it is hoped that this dissertation

has provided insight into the diversity of ASB and has demonstrated that a holistic approach is needed to best target and prioritise this type of crime.

In addition, the 25 flat regulation should be further assessed to maximise the benefits of compartmentalisation in both SBD estates and non-SBD estates, and should be adapted depending on the design of the buildings concerned.

Finally, a dataset on [police.co.uk](https://www.police.co.uk) (for example) on ASB incidents in the housing estates considered and in all residential areas would allow for a comprehensive review of such incidents and thus improve the assessment of compartmentalisation on ASB reduction.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Questions - Members of Erith Park

1. Questions - Residents in Erith Park:

1. Could you please tell me how long you have been living in the estate.
2. How often does antisocial behaviour happen in your estate? (follow up with weekly or daily if not specified)
3. What security measures are you aware of in your estate?
4. Follow up question: are you aware of the controlled access to the lifts and the doors in your flat?
5. Do you feel that the controlled access to lifts and doors implemented in your estate help to reduce anti-social behaviour?
6. How satisfied are you with the controlled access to lifts and doors implemented in your estate to tackle antisocial behaviour?
7. Do you think that controlling access to lifts or, controlling access to dedicated doorsteps is more effective to reducing antisocial behaviour?
8. Do you think that all flats should be compartmentalised? (if asked explain current 25 flat regulation)
9. Do you feel that there is a need for additional security measures in your estate to reduce or prevent anti-social behaviour?
10. Do you feel that the existing security measures implemented in your estate has had an impact on community cohesion? (provide explanation if asked i.e how you get along with your neighbours)
11. Do you feel safe in your community knowing that access to lifts and doors within your flat is restricted?
12. Are you fearful of antisocial behaviour?
13. Do you feel that having controlled access to lifts and doors in your flat has impacted your fear of antisocial behaviour?
14. Which security measure or measures would reduce or has reduced your fear of antisocial behaviour the most?

2. Questions - Managers:

1. Could you please tell me how long you have been managing the estate.
2. How often does antisocial behaviour happen in the estate? (follow up with weekly or daily if not specified)
3. Since the implementation of compartmentalisation, have you noticed a reduction in antisocial behaviour within the estate?
4. Do you think compartmentalisation can help reduce or prevent antisocial behaviour in Erith Park?

5. How has compartmentalisation impacted community cohesion since its implementation? (provide explanation if asked i.e how residents get along with their neighbours)
6. Has your interaction with members of the community changed since the implementation of compartmentalisation?
7. Have you noticed any changes in the way members of the community interact with one another since the implementation of compartmentalisation?
8. Do you think that all flats should be compartmentalised? (if asked explain current 25 flat regulation)
9. Do you think compartmentalisation alone in Erith Park is enough to prevent antisocial behaviour incidents from occurring within the estate entirely?

Appendix B: Interview Questions - Members of Belvedere Park

1. Questions - Residents:

1. Could you please tell me how long you have been living in the estate.
2. How often does antisocial behaviour happen in your estate? (follow up with weekly or daily if not specified)
3. Are you aware of the different security measures that have been implemented in your estate to reduce crime? (if not, these will be explained to the interviewee)
4. Do you feel that the security measures implemented in your estate help to reduce anti-social behaviour?
5. Would you feel safer in your estate if access to lifts in your flat was controlled?
6. Would you feel safer in your estate if access to doors on your floor was controlled?
7. Are you concerned that if access to lifts and doors are not implemented, antisocial behaviour incidents will rise in your estate?
8. Do you think that controlling access to lifts or, controlling access to doors is more effective to reducing antisocial behaviour?
9. Do you think that all flats should be compartmentalised? (if asked explain current 25 flat regulation)
10. Is there anything else you think would help to target or prevent antisocial behaviour in your estate?
11. Do you feel that the existing security measures implemented in your estate has had an impact on community cohesion? (provide explanation if asked i.e how you get along with your neighbours)
12. Do you think that having controlled access to lifts and doors would have an impact on how you interact with your neighbours?
13. Would you feel safer in your community if the access to lifts and doors within your flat was restricted?
14. Are you fearful of antisocial behaviour?
15. Do you feel that if controlled access to lifts and doors in your flat was implemented, this would have an effect on your fear of antisocial behaviour?
16. Which security measure do you think would reduce your fear of antisocial behaviour the most?

2. Questions - Managers:

1. Could you please tell me how long you have been managing the estate.
2. How often does antisocial behaviour happen in the estate? (follow up with weekly or daily if not specified)
3. What current security measures help tackle antisocial behaviour in Belvedere Park?
4. Do you think compartmentalisation could help reduce and/or prevent antisocial behaviour?
5. Do you feel that if Trinity Park was compartmentalised this would impact community safety?

6. Do you feel that if Belvedere Park was compartmentalised this would impact community cohesion?
(provide explanation if asked i.e how residents get along with their neighbours)
7. Do you think that all flats should be compartmentalised? (if asked explain current 25 flat regulation)
8. Do you think compartmentalisation alone in Belvedere Park is enough to prevent antisocial behaviour incidents from occurring within the estate entirely?

Appendix C: Interview Questions - SNT Officers

3. Questions - SNT officers:

1. Could you please tell me how long you have been policing the area.
2. How often do you patrol the area?
3. How often does antisocial behaviour occur in the area you patrol?
4. Do you think your policing practices regarding antisocial behaviour would be affected if compartmentalisation was introduced in estates like Belvedere Park?
5. Do you think compartmentalisation would be effective towards reducing antisocial behaviour?
6. Do you think compartmentalisation would have an impact on the community you patrol?
7. Do you feel that compartmentalisation would have an impact on community safety? (if not answered in previous question)
8. Do you think compartmentalisation would affect community cohesion within estates such as Belvedere Park?
9. Do you think compartmentalisation in estates alone is enough to prevent antisocial behaviour incidents from occurring within these estates entirely?
10. If compartmentalisation was introduced in Belvedere Park, do you think your interaction with members of the community would change?
11. Do you think the interaction between members of the community would change if compartmentalisation was implemented in their estate?
12. Of all security measures, do you feel that compartmentalisation is the most efficient one to tackle antisocial behaviour in estates?